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ABSTRACT
Little is known regarding how strategic problems are first sensed
and then subsequently formulated in complex organizations. This paper
reports the results of a survey of upper level executives that reveals
that commitment, conflict, avoidance, and political activities have a
significant influence on the process of gathering information about the
nature of a strategic problem.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the latest in a continuing saries of inquiries
into the processes by which strategic problems are first sensed and the
nature subsequently formulated in complex organizations. It presents
the results of a survey used to investigate the role of information
gathering activities on the formulation of problems as perceived by
executives of major corporations. Since socio-political variables in
general were found to be important in previous studies (Lyles, 1979,
1981; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980), the purpose of the present paper is to
assess more fully the impact of social-political variables on informa-
tion gathering in the strategic problem formulation process. By stra-
tegic problem formulation is meant the process of sensing, gathering
information about, and resolving the nature of strategic problems.
Most previous studies of organizational problem solving have
focused on procedures for solving a stated problem, i.e. , the choosing
of a single solution from a set of potential solutions. A number of
studies have focused on individual problem solving styles (Newell and
Simon, 1972; Taylor, 1975; Morse and Gordon, 1971), on groups, or
organizational decision-making (Ash, 1951; Sagasti and Mitroff, 1973;
Delbecq and Van de Ven, 1971). However, one particular aspect of
problem solving, namely the identification and formation of strategic
problems, has been an area almost devoid of research.
Only recently have there been an increasing number of calls for
empirical research in the area of problem formulation (Mintzberg,
Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Newell and Simon, 1976; Lubin, 1977).
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It is a fascinating and exciting area of strategic management since it
is the issue of agenda setting and its perception by upper management
that frequently determines the strategic direction of the organization.
The selection, definition, and formulation of what problems should be
attacked defines the basic set of threats and opportunities facing the
organization. Nonetheless up until now, most research and theoretical
efforts have been directed toward the discovery of optimal means for
solving an already given or stated problem, not on how to formulate a
problem in the first place.
Certainly one reason for this lack, of attention to the area of
problem formulation is the ambiguous and ill-structured nature of the
process of identifying the variables and their interrelationships.
For this very reason, it should be emphasized that the present study
is a continuation of an exploratory effort aimed at initially defining
variables that affect how strategic problems first get sensed and
identified by organizations.
The importance of socio-political influences on strategic manage-
ment processes has been well documented in the literature (Cyert and
March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1978; and Narayanan and Fahey, 1983),
The social structure of the organization becomes an important determi-
nant of how individuals acquire power and credibility, and these become
important determinants of an individual's ability to influence strategic
direction (Bower, 1970; MacMillan, 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Even the early studies specifically directed at the strategic problem
formulation process identify the importance of the socio-political
environment (Cyert, Simon, and Trow, 1956; Pounds, 1969; Hayes and
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Siraon, 1977; Herden and Lyles, 1981; Taylor, 1975). As the strategic
problem formulation process evolves, individuals interact and assess
how to develop a particular view of a problem as an issue that is
acceptable to those in power (Bower, 1970; Mintzberg, et. al, 1976).
Thus the specific result of the problem formulation process is deter-
mined by the power of individuals/coalitions, the credibility of
individuals/coalitions, pressures from the changing social environment,
and attempts to avoid the problem entirely (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980).
Despite these efforts, there still remain significant gaps in our
understanding of the actual processes used by organizations to diagnose
and define important problems. Lyles and Mitroff (1980) provided some
new but tentative insights into the processes which influence organiza-
tional problem formulation. Their investigation constitutes an explor-
atory study into determining how organizations become aware of the
existence of problems and the major variables that affect problem for-
mulation. The processes represent emergent thematic categories which
lend themselves to future empirical investigation. The processes inher-
ent in the themes emphasize the necessity of tying individual behavior
to organizational behavior and that merely looking at isolated attri-
butes (e.g., types of problems, inquiry system, etc.) may exclude much
of the richness of the political and social aspects of problem formula-
tion. Four emergent themes (Social-Individual, Social-Organizational,
Political-Individual, Political-Organizational) were identified from
this study as variables that influence the problem formulation process.
An early paper by Lyles (1978) proposed a theoretical model of the
problem formulation process,' and this model (see Figure 1) was tested
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in a later study (Lyles, 1981) in which the problem formulation process
of 33 case histories was analyzed and compared to the model. The
results suggest that most organizations do not go immediately from
sensing a proolera to agreement on the nature of the problem. In fact,
cycles occur within this procedure, and the time frame for defining a
problem vay cover several years. Many organizations reach an early
definition of the problem that then has to be reassessed.
As an extension of these two studies, this investigation is aimed
at operationalizing the emerging themes of the first study and testing
their influence on the information gathering activities (see Appendix
I) proposed in an earlier model (Lyles, 1978). In particular this
study addresses: (1) how do executives respond to the information
gathering activities, (2) could the socio-political themes be opera-
tionalized, and (3) which socio-political themes were of most influence
to the information gathering processes. We might expect some of the
following issues to be resolved:
(1) Are power and credibility particularly important when gathering
support for a particular view?
(2) Will avoidance of the existence of the problem take place while
scanning?
(3) Will pressure from changing conditions become important when
gathering information without a preconceived notion of the
problem?
(-+) Will power and credibility have little impact on exploration
which represents a more rational, scientific approach?
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Methodolog%
A survey instruraenc was developed and mailed to Fortune 500 com-
panies in six industries.* The questionnaire was sent to upper-level
executives in each company who had the title of vice-president or
above. Their positions represented diverse functional areas. Of the
460 questionnaires that were sent to current managers, 145 responses
were received, indicating a response rate of 32 percent. According to
both Goedeke and Tootelian (1976) and Mitt and Ireland (1982), a survey
of Fortune 500 companies that has a response rate over 20% is very
acceptable. Ninety-one questionnaires had the complete responses nec-
essary for the present study. Many of the unusable responses were in
the form of letters in which they explained that it was company policy
not to fill out questionnaires or surveys unless they were required to
do so by government legislation. The relatively low response rate was
anticipated by the authors for several reasons. First, the question-
naire was sent only to upper level executives and knowing the heavy
schedules of executives, it was expected that some would choose not to
respond. Secondly, the subject matter, namely problem formulation, is
an unusual topic and some executives would choose not to fill it out
because they would not be familiar with the topic. The authors feel
that those executives who did take the time to fill out the question-
naire and to get into the subject area had to be genuinely interested
*The industries included were: Office Equipment, Pharmaceuticals,
Electronics, Glass, Food, and Shipbuilding. These particular indus-
tries were chosen to represent different environmental effects on
problem formulation; however, the results showed no significant dif-
ferences based on industry type or environmental uncertainty.
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and responded to Che questionnaire as truthfully as possible. Although
the respondents were encouraged to mark any unclear questions or to
clarify their responses, few respondents indicated any problems in
filling out the questionnaire.
The mail questionnaire required each respondent to think, of a recent
strategic problem that has had "significant impact on your organization
as a whole . " Further, "the problem should be one in which you were or
are actively involved in identifying the existence of the problem or
defining the nature of the problem, as opposed to the solving of the
problem." In addition, it was stated that "the problem should not be
one that has been defined for the organization," i.e., as those iden-
tified by external forces or agencies. The respondents were asked to
then give a brief description of the problem or issue (Appendix II).
The heart of the questionnaire asked the individual to respond to
Liiert-type statements that described the process of problem formulation
and that indicated the importance of several influencing factors on the
problem formulation process. In each case, the respondents were asked
to respond in terms of their specified problems. This paper concen-
trates on the effect of the influencing factors on that portion of the
questionnaire dealing with information gathering items.
Four statements were used to reflect the Rationalization, Explora-
tion, Scanning, and Solicitation processes identified in the Lyles
'
(1931) model. The respondents were asked to rate these items based
with regard "to what extent do you agree the following statements' de-
scribe the process of problem formulation for this particular problem?"
Thirteen indicators were designed to measure the influencing factors
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that relate to the emergent theme categories identified by Lyles and
Mitroff (1980). A principal component analysis of the 13 influencing
indicators revealed four factors with eigenvalues greater than unity.
Further, the trend of a plot of the eigenvalues, called the scree test
(Cattail, 1966), showed a small slope from the fifth to thirteenth
value. Thus, four factors would appear to adequately describe the
indicator variables. These factors accounted for 64 percent of the
variance in the influencing indicators.
A varimax rotation (Kaiser, 1958) enhanced interpretation, and the
resulting factor structure is displayed in Table 1. Factor loadings
(indicator-factor correlations) of .4 or higher were considered salient
(Gorsuch, 1974), and reflected a well-defined structure. Two of the
indicators cross-loaded on two separate factors and showed approximately
on equal contribution to both factors. Since these two indicators pro-
vided no problems in terms of factorial simplicity, they were retained
for use in estimation of factor scores. Scores for the four influencing
factors were estimated by regression methods (Harmon, 1976), and were
uncorrelated (orthognal).
Insert Table 1 about here
The present investigation was concerned with the relationship be-
tween the set of response or dependent variables, the processes involved
in problem formulation, and the explantory set, the four influencing
factors. Since relationships involve sets of dependent and independent
variables, multivariate multiple regression was the appropriate analy-
tic technique (Bock, 1975). 'Further, the problem of multicollinearity
was eliminated since the derived factor scores were uncorrelated. This
allowed an unambiguous assessment of the contribution of each influenc-
ing factor to che explanation of the variance in the problem formula-
2
tion processes, as the sum of squared simple correlations equal R in
the case of orthogonalized explanatory variables (Bock, 1975, p. 380).
Thus, it was possible to assess, in an unconfounded manner, the impor-
tance of each influencing factor on the problem formulation process.
Results and Discussion
The multivariate multiple regression analysis begins with a com-
posite test of no association between the influencing factors and the
problem formulation processes. The multivariate test of no association
yielded a significant generalized F value of 5.56 with 16 and 254
degrees of freedom. Therefore, the hypothesis of no composite asso-
ciation was rejected, and it was assumed that there was a relationship
between the influencing factors and the problem formulation processes.
The means, standard deviation, and correlations of the processes
and the influencing factors are shown in Table 2. It should be noted
that the influencing factors have zero means, unit standard deviations,
and are uncorrelated. This uncorrelated condition allows the simple
correlations between the processes and the influencing factors to be
interpreted as Beta weights (Bock, 1975).
Insert Table 2 about here
The overall result of the multivariate multiple regression analysis
is shown in Table 3 in terms of squared simple correlations, multiple
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2
R
, Che univariate F and its P value under the hypothesis of no associ-
ation. The univariate tests indicated significant association between
the influencing factors and the processes of problem formulation.
Twenty percent of the variance in the Rationalization process was
2
accounted for by the influencing factors (R value). Credibility and
Power contributed significantly to the process of Rationalization. It
appears that when an individual or group is highly committed to a par-
ticular view and conflict occurs within the organization, the individual
or group will attempt to disclaim other views and try to strengthen the
argument supporting their view. They rely heavily upon how they are
perceived within the organization, their commitment, and their ability
to influence others, particularly when there is conflict within the
organization. Thus, Rationalization, or strong support for a particular
view, may also be a process of warding off and resistance to change.
Rationalization may be a mechanism of coping adopted by organizations
faced with "threatening" strategic problems.
Insert Table 3 about here
The influencing factors accounted for 14 percent of the variance
in the Exploration process. The association was a negative rela-
tionship for each factor, as shown in Table 2. The set of issues in
the Pressure themes within the organization were highly significant
(p < .001), and Power were very close to traditional significance
(p < .06). Since empirical data supplied to support a particular view
is the highest indicator loading on the Pressure factor (Table 1) , it
appears that Exploration is positively related to empirical evidence.
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Exploration seems to be a process for gathering information in a
"rational" organizational climate. In this "rational" organization,
political activities and fear would have a detrimental effect. In
organizations that were highly political, it is more likely that there
would be divergent views about the problem's nature. Since
Exploration assumes no a priori model of the problem's nature, it is
not a process that is consistent with an organization that has many
complex and different political groups. When comparing this to the
Rationalization process, it would appear that Rationalization is a
more likely process in politically-oriented organizations. Hence, the
more there are political pressures or that conflict exists, the less
inquiry there is into important factors and variables.
The influencing factors accounted for 28 and 40 percent, of the
variance in the processes associated with Diplomacy. It is imme-
diately apparent that these activities are strongly related to the
ability of an individual to influence the powerful and the degree to
which political activities occur in an organization. In other words,
in those organizations that can be characterized as highly political,
Diplomacy becomes an important phase of problem formulation. Power
and Credibility contributed significantly to the variance of the pro-
cess of Scanning. This suggests that power resources may act as an
impedance in resolving inquiry into a problem's nature. It becomes
necessary to test the use of power to support particular views. It
is not clear that in an uncertain decision situation, the powerful
decision-makers are unbiased. These decision-makers may, in fact, be
supporting views that enhance their own positions and interests.
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As with Scanning, the Power and Credibility factors contributed
significantly to the processes of Solicitation. The Credibility fac-
tor accounted for over 25 percent of the variance with regard to
Solicitation. Therefore, it appears that it is not enough to have
positional responsibility but a manager must be perceived as credible
and committed in order to gain support from the powerful. This may
correspond to the "belief" or credibility that Pettigrew (1973)
suggests is necessary to gathering and maintaining power.
Conclusion
This study has attempted to determine those factors which affect
information gathering activities during strategic problem formulation.
Clearly many other influencing variables could have been included in
the study; however, it was our intention to provide an initial attempt
at quantification based on previous studies in the area. The idea
that information gathering in problem formulation seems to be related
to the political nature of the organization and to the credibility and
commitment of individual stakeholders is apparent. Coping with the
complex process of defining the nature of ambiguous decision situations
can be thought of as managing a highly politicalized negotation of
power and information. This differs little from the fragmented, highly
political processes described by Lindbloom (1965) or the process of
looking for problems described by Cohen, Marsh and Olsen (1972). It
seems clear that the individual or group who has credibility, diploma-
tic skills, and is committed to a particular view can successfully
impact the processes of information gathering during problem formula-
tion. However, since our sample was drawn from individual respondents,
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each of whom may have inflated his or her own individual importance,
we cannot rule out other organizational influences.
Exploration, which represents more of the traditional view of
rational information gathering, has only a slight association with
other processes. Information gathering about the problem's nature is
perceived by managers as being either a "rational" or a political pro-
cess. If it is "rational," i.e., no a priori model, it is an attempt
to include comprehensive information gathering and reflects a very
socially desirable process.
Certainly important to the process of problem formulation are
those information gathering activities which involve defining sources
of information, types of information to be acquired, and the process
of inquiry itself. However, the results of this study suggest that
what appears to be most influential within complex organizations is
the ability of individuals to influence this process and to attempt
to structure the results so that they are consistent with their own
values and goals. Their influence on the organization seems to be
highly dependent on the individual's ability to acquire power
resources and to develop an image or myth enhancing his/her own
credibilitv and commitment.
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TABLE 3
2
Square Simple Correlations, R , and UNIVARIATE F RATIOS
Influencing
Factors Process
Rat ionalization Exploration Scanning Solicitation
Power .067* .035 .203* .118*
Avoidance .023 .017 .029 .004
Credibility .108* .012 .033* .261*
Pressure .002 .077* .013 .014
R
2
.200 .141 .283 .397
F 5.357 3.527 8.500 14.143
P .000 .010 .000 .000
*Simple correlation significantly different from zero at .05 level.
APPENDIX I
Information Gathering Activities
Rationalization The process of gathering information
to support a particular view of the
problem and to disclaim other views.
Exploration The process of determining the impor-
tant factors and variables affecting
the nature of the problem without a
preconceived notion regarding the
problem's nature.
Scanning The process of determining how the
powerful people in the organization
were aligned regarding the nature of
the problem.
Solicitation The process of gathering support of
the powerful to support a particular
view.
APPENDIX II
Examples of Brief Statement of Problems
Two profit center divisions that produce food products but use
separate sales forces which are governed by conflicting philosophies
and policies.
Establishment of a holding company to achieve added growth and
improve return on equity vs. our current modus operandi. A
different method to increase equity.
Is it economically sound to invest $8 million in updating or re-
placing animal feed manufacturing facilities in the northeast?
The organizational and goal structure of new product development
which is time/cost consuming and is overwhelmed by CYA instead of
entrepreneurship (not unique to this company).
Proposed government regulation of such proportion as to fundamen-
tally change our company.
Declining sales volume in several key product lines.


